A two-person zero-sum time-sequential game for sums of lid random variables, in which decision for the players at each stage is either to accept or reject sequentially presented LV.'S, each LV. is selected only wh€:n both players accept it, and each player has a limited number of rejections he can excercise. The algorithm for deriving the optimal strategies is given and a numerical calculation is provided for the case of uniform distribution. The bilateralgame version, in which decisions are made by each side one by one, is also discussed and is shown to possess "reversibility" of the optimal strategies. These results clarify some earlier works in this area.
the game E IT X." where i's represent all the jurors so far selected. In [2J . , 1 the algoritk for deriving optimal strategies and values in this timesequential zero-sum game, is given, and some numerical calculations of them are provided.
The purpose of this note is to present the solution algorithm of the alternative version of the game in which the payoff is defined by the sum L X. " instead of the product IT X. ,. Although the difference of the t-v1O
., 1 ., 1
~ersions is seemingly slight, the study of our version is not valueless since
(1) This class of time-Bequential games for sums of random variables is often found in our real life in which player 11 gives a fixed number, J, of offers to player I in a given horizon. The pairs of players 11-1, are, for example, father-sons, husband-wife, bank-entrepreneur, government-corporation, etc.
(2) It provides an i~portant generalization of the now classical work by Gilbert and Mosteller [4] and gives a forsight to the further work in the line of works [5J and [6J.
Solution of the Zero-·Sum Game for the Sum
Let Xi' i=1,2, ... , be iid random variables that can be observed one by one sequentially. Players I and 11 are asked to select a set of r observations. The common cdf F(x) of each X. is assumed to be known by both players.
1
Let Xi" i' =1, ... , r, be the set of r selected observations, and suppose that the objective of I(II)'s sequential decisions is to maximize (minimize) the r expected value E( L X. 1 ) , of the sum of the observations they have selected .
. , 1 1 Let 0 = (j, §.,=15) denote the state of the process in which j r.v. 's remain to be selected and the players I and 11 have currently a and b times of rejection, respectively, still remaining. Also let a = (j, a-l, b), i3 = (j, a, b-l), y = (j-l, a, b) and 0 = (j, a-l, b-l). Then these states represent the four possible states that can be reached (in principle at least) from 0 by the decision pair rej-acc, aec-rej, acc-acc, and rej-rej, respectively. Let V(o) be the value of the game in state o. Also let V(o I x) be the conditional value of the game in state 0 given that the observation x is currently observed.
Then we have
Copyright © by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. since we may su.ppose that, for any history of the process, the relation expressed by the inequalities Basing on these inequalities it follows that the 2 x 2 matrix in the right-hand side of (2.2) has saddle point:3 at
Hence we conclude that if both players play optimally, they will never both reject the same observation. (ii) The boundary conditions for (2. This completes the proof of the theorem. Table 1 Optimal values v*(r, n-r) for the uniform, exponential and normal distirubtions, for r 1(1)3, n = 1(1)10, are given in Table 14 Of [4] . Similar arguments .,ill be made from the side of the minimizer (L e. , player II). With (j, b) = (r, n-r), (2.6) becomes v**(r, n-r) = v**(r-l, n-r) + EX -TF(v**(r, n-r-l) -v**(r-l,n-r)), This fact, called "reversibility", is proven under the more general setting of the underlying decision process in [3 ; Theorems 2 and 5], so that our result serves as a reconfirmation of the main result of [3] .
If a
(1 ~ r ~ n-l) ,
